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Abstract 
 
In seeking to achieve poverty alleviation and environmental conservation, public 
policy has often centred on guaranteeing land titles to local peoples. However, such 
approaches have brought unintended outcomes, replacing small-scale economies and 
natural areas by intensive exploitation of resources with no clear improvement in 
local people’s wellbeing. To understand this, we go beyond a general political 
ecology framing to consider relations between sustainability and land tenure, focusing 
on the intersection of economics, ecology and anthropology to understand how land 
tenure, property and use play out on the ground. We draw together different concepts 
including bundle of rights, de facto and de jure resource use, property regimes, 
density-dependence and non-equilibrium theory. The significance of this three-
discipline view is illustrated through a case study of the Pantanal wetland, Brazil, 
where conservationists, the government and the local population contest ownership of 
the Paraguay River floodplain. Government sought to address conflicts around tenure 
and access through a narrow view of property, which failed to encompass the 
overlapping layers of land tenure, property and use on the ground and only served to 
create further legal battles. This article concludes that a more complex view 
combining the three perspectives is needed in the case of the Pantanal, and in other 
cases of contested property rights, in order to resolve conflicting claims and foster 
sustainability. We dissect both the power plays involved between different groups 
competing for control of a valuable resource, and the legal frameworks which can and 
should provide checks and balances in the system. The more nuanced grasp that 
emerges of local systems of tenure and access, of how these diverge from western 
property concepts, and of their environmental implications favours a better 
understanding of local realities, allowing for better management policy and 
consequently contributing more effectively towards poverty alleviation and 
environmental protection. 
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Highlights 
 Conventional property systems do not map well onto unpredictable, dynamic 
ecosystems 
 Resource access and use in wetlands and semi-arid rangelands are customarily 
mobile 
 Locally-adapted resource use, not specific property regime, dictates 
sustainability  
 Economics, anthropology and ecology help address land conflict in Brazil’s 
Pantanal 
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 Multidisciplinary approaches mesh management policies better with local 
realities 
 
1. Introduction  
Secure access to land and guaranteed property rights are assumed to be key elements 
in tackling poverty alleviation and environmental conservation (FAO, 2012, pp.3). 
Insecurity of land tenure and lack of established property rights are singled out as the 
main causes of deforestation in the Amazon (Nolte et al., 2013), of failures to reduce 
poverty in Africa (Peters, 2004) and of the collapse of marine fisheries (Pauly, 2003). 
The main approach to deal with these challenges has been to grant property titles and 
to set up modern land registries (Zoomers and Haar, 2000). The conversion of 
collective and customary land rights into formal, individual rights, and the creation of 
free land markets in principle gives poor people the ability to sell or rent land to third 
parties and to use land as a collateral for credit (De Soto, 2000). Moreover security of 
tenure is presented as a prerequisite for the establishment of protected areas, payment 
for ecosystem services projects and for most biodiversity protection schemes focused 
on specific sites (van der Ploeg et al., 2016). Since the 1990s, based on this view, a 
great international effort has gone into programs focused on providing land title to 
residents (Zoomers, 2010). In Afghanistan alone the US international development 
agency USAID invested $56.3 millions on a program focused on Land titling between 
2004 and 2009 (Manila, 2009). The Brazilian Government plans a similar investment, 
claiming that deforestation in the Amazon will only end when ownership is 
established across the area (MMA, 2013).   
However, such approaches have precipitated outcomes rather different from their 
stated purpose. The liberalisation of land markets led to land grabbing, with foreign 
investors buying land to expand forestry, mineral extraction and commercial 
plantation projects in and around the global south (Borras et al., 2011). In 2007, 500 
billion USD was invested in developing countries; most of this went to those 
industries (Zoomers, 2010). Locally, the consequences involve replacement of small 
scale economies and natural areas by intensive resource exploitation (Nayar, 2012). 
Empirical evidence shows that in many cases far from improving local people’s 
wellbeing, land titling has increased environment impact (Pinckney and Kimuyu, 
1994; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009; van der Ploeg et al., 2016). Therefore, although the 
link between sustainability and property regime is presented in official narratives as 
established, policymakers and management practices still fail to achieve sustainability 
in practice, leading rather to unanticipated outcomes. Understanding why land titling 
is failing is fundamental to proceed more effectively in poverty alleviation and 
biodiversity conservation. The first step in doing so is to unpack this assumed link 
(Von Benda-Beckman et al., 2006) to give a nuanced grasp of local systems of tenure 
and access, of how these diverge from western property concepts, and of the 
environmental implications of different systems. In doing so it is important to 
understand the political ecology behind the way the assumed link between property 
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system and sustainability is used in the power plays between different groups 
competing for control of a valuable resource. It is also important to analyse the legal 
frameworks which can and should preclude silent violence towards marginalised 
groups on the one hand, and destructive environmental practices on the other. Even 
where in reality enforcement is currently weak, the law provides a foundation for 
ultimately more effective regulation. 
1.1. Unpacking sustainability and Land tenure 
Economists, ecologists, and anthropologists have all theorised the relationship 
between property systems and sustainability. We first outline how each discipline has 
looked at these issues, and the intersections between them, then illustrate a more 
integrated interdisciplinary view in a case study from the Pantanal wetland, Brazil, 
where conservationists, local government and fishermen contest ownership of the 
floodplain. We conclude by exploring how one might better approach similarly 
contested property situations to foster sustainability in other ecosystems.   
1.2. Economists’ perspective 
For most economists, land tenure and sustainability have long been grounded in ideas 
of private property, (Horsley, 2011). The nation state using the power of law can 
guarantee and enforce legal rights over property such as land, ensuring that the owner 
has the right to restrict use by others (Freyfogle, 2011). “Ownership” and the “right to 
exclude”, came to be, for neoclassical economists, the defining features of a properly 
functioning property regime (Dagan, 2011), such that without them, there is no 
property (Blackstonian notion of property:  Rose, 1998). 
20th century neoclassical economists addressing anthropogenic impacts on common 
pool resources1, applied this western property concept to theorise sustainability. 
Hardin (1968), for instance, suggested that communities living on common pool 
resources such as grazing lands and fisheries lack regulated resource use. He saw the 
instinct for individual accumulation as inevitably driving resources to degradation: the 
“Tragedy of the commons”. According to this idea, the only way to guarantee long-
term use is to establish private ownership and the right to exclude through 
privatization or state control. More recently, building on multiple empirical examples, 
Ostrom pointed out that customary rules governing access to and use of common pool 
resources could function as collective ownership giving people the right to exclude 
outsiders and regulate use (Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 1999; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992): 
common property regimes (CPR), leading to sustainability in the absence of 
privatization or state control (Agrawal, 2001). Despite their opposing views, Ostrom 
                                                        
1 For a more detailed definition: Common-pool resources (CPoRs) are natural or human-made 
resources where one person's use subtracts from another's use and where it is often necessary, but 
difficult and costly, to exclude other users outside the group from using the resource 
(https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/contentguidelines) 
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and Hardin see “rules” on use (property regimes) as leading to sustainability and “lack 
of rules” (open access or non-property) to overexploitation (Behnke et al., 2016). 
Based on this view, property is commonly divided into four categories: private 
property (owned by an individual or corporate body), state property, common 
property (owned by a socially-defined group of individuals, often with flexible social 
and spatial boundaries), and finally, open access (no exclusive owners, “first-come-
first-served”). Together these categories have become so widely accepted that they 
are known as the “Big Four” (Von Benda-Beckman et al., 2006). 
However, empirical data suggest an even more complex reality underlying evolving 
notions of property (Rose, 1998). Places may have more than one owner, normally 
with different levels of ownership, and at each level a co-owner can share their rights 
within their own network, blurring the boundaries as to who is the owner and who can 
be excluded. Moreover, ownership is normally linked to a given time and place, 
changing according to external and internal factors (Freyfogle, 2011). Property, then, 
should be seen as evolving multiple layers of ownership perhaps best captured by the 
term “bundle of rights” (Klick and Parchomovsky, 2016). Some societies have very 
different notions of property and rights altogether. For instance, in some Amazonian 
groups, ownership may be attributed to a spirit world rather than to humans: access 
must be negotiated, and use propitiated (Brightman et al., 2016). Across a wide range 
of cases, defined ownership and the right to exclude are not clearly tied to any 
particular one of the given “Big 4” categories, and these categories do not map in any 
straightforward way to sustainability (Galik and Jagger, 2015).  
In face of this more nuanced understanding of property, there have been many 
attempts to re-shape the so-called “Big 4”, including suggestions for creating new 
categories of property (for example: “managed open access (MOA)”: Moritz et al 
2014b, 2013b). However, we argue that just as for the “Big 4” categories, 
sustainability is not due to a specific property category but rather to multiple specific 
interacting factors (Dagan, 2011), as explored in more detail below. Creating new 
categories and labels will not help approximate theory to reality.  
1.3. Ecologists’ perspective 
‘Property’ per se plays no formal part in ecological models, but these use related 
concepts of exclusion and territoriality to explain wildlife population dynamics and 
use of natural resources. Classical theories centred on the idea that species 
populations are auto-regulated around an equilibrium capacity by density-dependent 
mechanisms (May, 1974).  Most ecological management actions focusing on 
sustainability build on key concepts of Optimal Foraging (OF: MacArthur and Pianka, 
1966), Ideal Free Distribution (IDF: Kennedy and Gray, 1993) and Metapopulation 
(Hanski, 1998).  
 5 
Optimal Foraging (OF) sees species’ resource use as governed by underlying 
behavioural rules optimizing net energy gains. IFD postulates that individuals 
distribute themselves proportionally to resource availability because of OF, 
minimizing competition and maximizing resource access and use (Davies et al., 2012; 
Kennedy and Gray, 1993). IFD is in many ways equivalent to open access in 
economic theory. In ecological thinking, however, IFD leads to distribution in 
equilibrium with resource availability (Behnke et al., 2016), where open access, in 
economists’ thinking, combines with individual accumulation to lead to over-use. 
Although developed as concepts for “natural ecosystems”, some authors have started 
to use OF/IFD to explain resource use behaviour of pastoralists, fishermen, etc. 
(Behnke et al., 2016; Beitl, 2015; Wallace et al., 2016), and the sustainability of 
socio-ecological systems (Moritz et al., 2014, 2013; Xiao et al., 2015). 
Metapopulation constitutes another important dimension in theorizing sustainability 
and management of natural resources. Building on the “Theory of Island 
Biogeography” (MacArthur & Wilson (1967), Levins (1969) applied ideas of spatial 
distribution and density-dependence to patchy mainland landscapes, elaborating the 
“meta-population” concept. Metapopulations are fragmented, spatially isolated 
populations linked by the continual dispersal of individuals, with repeated extinctions 
and re-colonizations in each population generating a dynamic sustaining the whole 
metapopulation (Hanski, 1998). Mobile systems (whereby resource users move 
between patches as a resource is locally depleted) have been hailed as indicating 
sustainable management for Non Timber Forest Products (Assies, 1997), grazing 
(Kothari et al., 2013), fishing (Berkes, 2006), agriculture (Sunderlin et al., 2005), and 
bushmeat hunting  (Kümpel et al. 2009). Rotational use helps to avoid exhaustion of 
natural resources because it allows different populations to recolonize depleted areas 
– as predicted by the metapopulation concept (Wilson et al., 1994).  
Density-dependence is a significant driver of regulation mainly in very low or very 
high population densities (Turchin, 1995), but for many non-temperate systems, 
populations display chaotic changes rather than smoothly density-dependent 
responses (May, 1974). Ecological systems may shift between multiple alternative 
temporarily stable states, without ever progressing to a climax (Ellis and Swift, 2006; 
Wehrden et al., 2012) but also without undergoing irreversible degradation or collapse 
(Derry and Boone, 2010).  
This thinking has tremendous implications for human use of biodiversity (Berkes, 
2006). For instance, multispecies fish population growth is chaotic, and consequently 
enforcement designed around ideas of equilibrium in single-species population 
dynamics has little relevance for sustainability. Connectivity, number of suitable 
habitat patches and ecological variations through time may be more important 
determinants of  local fisheries’ sustainability than the size of fish stock itself (Valley 
and Freeney 2013; Wilson et al. 1994, 2013). Spatially explicit evaluations 
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considering “how”, “where” and “when” people fish should be added to the current 
focus on “how many” fish are taken (Wilson et al. 1994).  
Noy-Meir, (1975), theorizing grazing patterns, added consideration of unexploitable 
reserves. Some plant growth is available for grazing, inaccessible through, for 
example, seasonal flooding or as underground storage organs (roots, bulbs). 
Temporarily “ungrazeable” reserve biomass means even high herbivore grazing 
pressures can be sustainable and represents an important part of the real-world system 
dynamics. In the Logone Floodplain, Cameroon, two-thirds of the biomass is stored 
underground and the aboveground vegetation is inaccessible due to floods during four 
to six months of the year (Scholte, 2007). Thus, due to the presence of natural 
reserves and the continual process of recolonization, high densities of livestock can be 
kept by pastoralists, even to the point of temporary overgrazing in some resource 
patches, with no cumulative effect on the long-term sustainability of the system 
(Homewood, 1994; Homewood and Rodgers, 1987).  The importance of 
unexploitable reserves has been shown to be part of many systems and is fundamental 
to population dynamics and evolution (Berryman and Hawkins, 2006) 
However, density-dependence, equilibrium, OF / IFD, and metapopulation all remain 
important drivers of socio-ecological systems. For instance, IFD dynamics can partly 
explain how resource users are spread over the landscape and its sustainability (or 
lack of it) (Behnke et al., 2016) and metapopulation theory can give important 
insights to deconstruct overuse narratives (Hayden et al., 2015). The temporal and 
spatial combination of these many factors dictates species population responses and 
their distribution. Therefore the best way to guarantee sustainability of natural 
resource use is to monitor the most important drivers in any given time and place and 
constantly re-evaluate that potentially changing importance and whether they should 
be replaced or aggregated with others: an approach now called adaptive management 
(McLain and Lee, 1996; Rist et al., 2013; Westgate et al., 2013).    
1.4. Anthropologists’ perspective  
Anthropologists see property concepts as land tenure arrangements embodying 
relationships among individuals or groups. From this perspective formal property 
ownership is just one of a number of ways access is granted (Ribot & Peluso, 2009), 
including de facto and de jure factors (Ribot, 1998). De facto mechanisms (friendship, 
status, age, historical ties, etc.) are social constructions being constantly reworked 
with some gaining access and others losing it (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002). 
Changes through time leave their marks imprinted in continuing patterns of use 
(Behnke et al., 2016). Therefore, historical understanding is fundamental to 
comprehending the current status of access and use in any socio-ecological system.  
De jure factors involve politico-legal institutions recognizing and supporting the 
claims of a group of people (Sikor and Lund, 2009), giving them the right to use a 
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resource, creating property (Ribot 1998). De jure rights also change through time as a 
consequence of changes in power structures or in legal and political perspectives on 
the target natural resource (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002). Communities thus need to 
be understood as continually evolving products of ongoing social, economic and 
political negotiations; and as comprising groups of different actors or stakeholders 
with different entitlements and preferences for resource use (Allison and Ellis 2001), 
operating through local politics and strategic interactions, with the possibility of 
layered alliances spanning multiple levels of interactions (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; 
Haller et al., 2013). Formal and informal land tenure access and use are not clearly 
separated. Each continually influences institutions and governance, and continually 
morphs into the other (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002). 
Empirical and ethnographic analyses support the idea that property is better seen as a 
“bundle of rights”, in which resources, rights to their access and use can be broken up 
and reorganized into uncountable layers depending on time, space, and history (Von 
Benda-Beckman et al., 2006, Kay, 2015). However, ethnographic analysis shows that 
indigenous communities have very different understandings of property from that 
conceptualized by western groups (Hann, 1998). It is common to find property 
incorporating emotive claims of identity for small-scale societies; in some Amazonian 
groups, concepts of ownership bind places together through relations between non-
human persons with whom humans must interact in a variety of ways, and may span 
hunting, gardening and shamanism (Brightman et al., 2016). For such societies 
property itself appears as a process, it is a way of establishing relations between 
people and things. The encounter between the western and non-western cultures is not 
an encounter between societies with and without property (Brightman, 2010), but 
rather between very different concepts of property, making conflict almost inevitable. 
To propose sustainable solutions for this it is essential, therefore, to better understand 
the full range of notions of property. 
1.5. Sustainability and a multi-faceted view of property 
Although these three views of property come from different disciplinary backgrounds, 
they intersect on the current understanding that sustainable outcomes are best 
explained by a combination of the different layers that dictate how people and other 
species control and access natural resources (Berkes, 2007, 2004). Thus, rational 
choice theory, property categories, and ecosystem complexity need to be integrated 
with understandings gained from history and other social drivers, and vice versa 
(Hayden et al., 2015). This paper uses these different yet complementary views of 
property to better tackle sustainability. It uses a conservation conflict regarding 
different understandings of floodplain ownership in the Western Border of the 
Pantanal wetland, Brazil, where policymakers have sought but failed to resolve 
competing claims through a single economic view of property. It illustrates how this 
idealized economic notion of ownership differs from reality due to social, historical 
and environmental factors. It shows then that this divergence between reality and 
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management practice is one of the main reasons for the failure of property rights to 
achieve poverty alleviation and biodiversity conservation. It explores the power plays 
involved between different groups competing for control of a valuable resource, and 
the legal frameworks which can and should provide checks and balances in the 
system. A nuanced grasp of local systems of tenure and access, of how these diverge 
from western property concepts, and of their environmental implications delivers 
insights as to how a wider view of property rights could perhaps foster more 
sustainable development in other dynamic ecosystems experiencing periodic 
fluctuations similar to the Pantanal.  
1.1. The Study site  
The Pantanal is considered one of the biggest wetlands in the world, straddling three 
countries (Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay) and covering over 160 000 km2 (Keddy et al. 
2009). The annual flood pulse is mostly driven by the Paraguay River (Figure 1), 
starting in the northern region and finishing in the south. Due to the slight gradient of 
the terrain in the Pantanal (2–3 cm/km north to south, and 5–25 cm/km east to west) 
the flood pulse takes 3–4 months to pass through (Junk et al., 2011).  
The Pantanal catchment area receives very variable precipitation, and depending on 
the quantity of rain, flood size and extent of areas inundated differ from year to year 
(Junk et al., 2011), ranging from 11,000 km2 to 110,000 km2 (Hamilton et al., 1996).  
The unpredictable nature of the Pantanal floods and, therefore, the ever-changing 
river drainage network leads to profound fluctuations in access to natural resources, 
including fish (Assine et al., 2015). Depending on the characteristics of each year’s 
flood pulse, water bodies can gain or lose their connection with the main river, which 
dictates people’s access to individual sites (Mourão et al., 1996).  
In the Western Border of the Pantanal there is intense conflict over land tenure 
(Chiaravalloti, 2016). The region hosts rare and endangered species such as jaguars 
(Panthera onca), bush dogs (Speothos venaticus); endemic species of amphibians, 
reptiles, plants, and a putative new primate species (Tomas et al., 2010). To protect 
this region, environmental NGOs imposed physical and economic displacement on 
fishing communities who have been living in the Pantanal for at least 150 years 
(Chiaravalloti, 2016). Grassroots NGOs supporting local people’s rights brought in 
Federal Prosecutors to review the restrictions. Although they assured local people of 
their rights to use the area, the land tenure conflict became a legal battle among 
environmental NGOs, local people and, ultimately, prosecutors trying to define 
ownership and rights over the Pantanal floodplain, Brazil.  
1.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
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Over a period of almost three years, qualitative data were collected with local 
stakeholders in the Pantanal to understand the conflict over property rights (April 
2014 till March 2015; January 2016 till June 2016).  
First, in order to better understand historical and customary rights, participant 
observation was carried out in Settlement 1 (Figure 1). Sharing activities such as 
gathering bait, fishing, logging, collecting manioc, cooking and cleaning fish, helped 
to understand the patterns of land tenure, access, and natural resource use that 
characterize the local people and to check the validity of findings from other research 
methods such as interviews and participatory mapping. The field trips were divided 
into dry season (April-June, 2014 – May-June / 2016), flood season (August – 
October, 2014), and closed fishing season (November / 2014 – February-March / 
2015). During each trip semi-structured interviews were held focusing on current and 
historical resource use. To better represent issues related to natural resource use by 
local people, new Brazilian “Rapid Eye” satellite (5 metre resolution;1:20 000 scale) 
were used in all interviews. All maps were printed on a special plastic paper, which 
people could draw on, easily erase, and then draw again. Hence, after all interviews 
pictures were taken of these locally-created maps and all the information on the maps 
was then erased. In total 46 local people were interviewed, most (40) being from 
Settlement 1. Two families used handheld GPS to record their daily activities and 
boat or canoe tracks. In each GPS, we installed an individually-adapted version of 
Sapelli software allowing them to record their geographic position, time and type of 
resource use activities throughout the year (Lewis, 2007; Vitos et al., 2013). 
To understand the legal battles in the region seven prosecutors involved in the case 
were interviewed and all legal processes reviewed and analysed. Moreover, eight 
protected area staff and 10 local scientists working in the region were interviewed.  
2. Case study  
2.1. Colonization, land titling and conservation in the Pantanal 
The Portuguese Empire conquered The Pantanal region in the 18th century; after 
initial military occupation they started to give land to people willing to settle in the 
area (Costa, 1999). The first land was given in 1727 (Silva and Silva, 1995), and soon 
the first cattle ranches were established, with accounts of cattle already emerging in 
1737 (Abreu et al., 2010). Nonetheless land title was only ratified in 1850 through the 
“Law of Land” in an attempt to formalize the occupation promoted during the 18th 
century (Silva and Silva, 1995).  
Although formally occupied, it took another three centuries for the Pantanal region to 
be integrated into the national economy. It was only in the 1960s and 1970s in the 
Military Period, that the Brazilian Government started to promote the local economy 
through national plans of integration, such as: National Rural Credit, Development 
Council of Beef Cattle, and construction of highways connecting Brazil’s north and 
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south, west and east (Franco et al., 2013; Silva and Silva, 1995). In the Pantanal, after 
these plans were put into action the production of cattle went from an offtake of 
700,000 to 5 million animals annually in the beginning of the 1970s (Abreu et al., 
2010). The expansion of cattle ranches was favoured by a coincidental sequence of 
dry years in the Pantanal. From the early 1960s till the middle 1970s was the driest 
period ever recorded; low flood levels exposed and maintained a great abundance of 
natural grassland (Mourão et al., 2010).  
In 1974, however, the region faced major changes. A large flood inundated most of 
the grasslands and reportedly killed half of the Pantanal’s cattle population (Junk et 
al., 2011). The extent of annual floods and permanent flooding has remained high 
since then and in the western region, where water is retained as large lakes (Padovani, 
2010), many farms went bankrupt (Bello, 2014). In the face of economic collapse in 
the region and increasing international pressure from well-known environmentalists 
(Schaller and Vasconcelos, 1978), in 1975, the Brazilian Institute of Forest 
Development (IBDF) established a project buying these farms to expand a Protected 
Area first created in 1971 (Couto et al., 1975). In 1981, the Federal Government 
created the Federal National Park of the Pantanal, expanding the area protected from 
80 000 to 130 000 ha (Jesus and Lima, 2003). 10 years later, in the early 1990s, with 
support from the NGO The Nature Conservancy, three other large farms were bought 
and converted into Private Protected Areas (Bello, 2014). In 2005 and, then in 2006, 
two other Private Protected Areas were aggregated, leading to the establishment of the 
environment group “Protection and Conservation Network for the Amolar Region” 
(PCNAR). This is a partnership among all Protected Area managers, including the 
federal agency of Protected Areas, NGOs and local Forest Policy agents, aiming to 
monitor resource use across 310km linear river distance and adjacent channels, 
securing strict conservation of 262,000 ha of Protected Areas in the Western Border 
of the Pantanal (Bertassoni et al., 2012). According to informant 28, 29, and 30, all of 
them part of the group, PCNAR started with 5 million BRL [1.44 million USD] from 
a Brazilian mining company owning one of the Private Protected Areas, and then 
continued activities funded by an endowment from a Brazilian investment bank 
owning another Private Protected Area.  
It is important to note that because this area is been partly inundated since the 1970s, 
most Protected Area boundaries are either permanently under the water, or partially 
inundated during the flood season (Figure 1). However, even so, they have been 
recognized by the federal government through the Brazilian Agency of Protected 
Areas (ICMBio)2 and their land titles certified by federal prosecutors during lawsuits 
(MPF, 2013).  
                                                        
2 http://sistemas.icmbio.gov.br/simrppn/publico/rppn/MS/ 
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Figure 1: Protected Area limits overlaid on flooding and dry areas. The inside map on the right highlights 
the location of the Pantanal in Brazil.  
2.2. Fishermen communities and their traditional right over the floodplain 
Present-day non-indigenous communities were formed 100-150 years ago by a mix of 
workers from gold mines at Cuiabá-MT, local indigenous people (mainly Guatós who 
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had survived colonization), several soldiers from the Paraguayan War (the War of 
Triple Alliance,1864-1870, fought over this region) who stayed on after the war rather 
than returning to their places of origin, and Paraguayans who came to live in this 
region due to the wave of poverty and disease experienced by their country as a 
consequence of the same war (Ribeiro, 2005; Silva and Silva, 1995). Their livelihoods 
alternated between working for landowners in the cattle ranches, poaching (especially 
1950s-early 1980s), and most importantly, fishing – a long-term activity, with records 
of fishermen communities selling fish in the nearest city Corumbá already in the 18th 
century (Silva, 1986). In the present study, 95% of local interviewees self-identified 
as fishermen. 
Although currently there are around 400 people within some 60 nuclear families 
living in three main settlements (Figure 1), extended families with between 15-20 
people used to live on man-made or natural mounds over the floodplain moving their 
settlements according to changes in the landscape: “when I was young we used to 
keep moving trying to find a better place to live, we eventually moved three or four 
times in one year” (informant 15, male, 65 years, fisherman). Some of the old 
settlements were located within private farms. However, there are no reports of 
disagreements between local people and farmers, perhaps because there was no 
conflict of interest, the former using floodplain areas and the latter dry land. Some 
people still hold formal letters from farmers authorizing them to use and live inside 
the farm boundaries with the obligation to take care and report any invasion or cattle 
robbery in their areas, as reported by informant 38 (fisherman, male, 55 years).  
Settlement 1, where this study was focused, was according to local people created as a 
consequence of the Protected Areas displacement. The first displacement was in the 
1980s, soon after the National Park was set aside, as claimed by some informants 
“when they created the National Park we were living in Porto Brazil, they gave us 3 
days to leave the place, we put all our belongings in two canoes and sailed for two 
days trying to find a dry land” (informant 4, female, 46 years, bait gatherer), and 
“When we were living in the region of the National Park, they came and tied 
Informant 13 hands and feet and beat him until he fainted” (informant 6, male, 57 
years, bait gatherer). The second alleged displacement occurred in the 1990s, when 
the first Private Protected Areas were created. In the area where some families used to 
live there are still remnants of their former houses. 
Currently there are three extended families living in Settlement 1, comprising 23 
nuclear families totalling 71 people. However, there were likely to have been more 
living in the region when the Protected Areas were created. The area has seen a great 
exodus from rural areas in the last few decades, and local people remember as many 
as 10 other extended families living in the region. According to local people, 
Settlement 1’s current location was used by one of the extended families in the region 
from roughly 1960s-1980s, and then abandoned because the matriarch of the family 
died from snakebite. Settlement 1 is surrounded by rivers, and all families are 
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clustered in roughly 20.5 ha. The region is referred to as “the island”. No information 
was collected about claimed displacements in the other settlements.  
People from Settlement 1 were able to record and point out important locations of 
their historical and customary use throughout the floodplain (Figure 2) and 
surrounding these sites they drew on the satellite images what they called “their area” 
(referred to here as territory) demarcating the limit beyond which someone from 
another settlement cannot enter to fish, gather bait, plant, or settle. Although no data 
on exact limits of traditional territories were collected in the other two settlements, the 
same idea of “each group has its own area” was mentioned in their interviews, with 
clear notions as to the number of people allowed access, as to who controls the use of 
specific spots and with whom each person shares the information about fishing spots. 
The area defined as the territory of Settlement 1 covers 33,651 ha.  
The territory encompasses a Rotational Fishing System (RFS). Chiaravalloti (in press) 
showed that RFS in the Pantanal is undertaken by constantly moving fishing sites 
according to the flood pulse changes, and especially the appearance of drawdown 
areas. Hence, after the inundation starts people move their fishing sites to the northern 
region of the territory and slowly follow in the wake of the flood pulse as it 
progresses south, finishing at the southernmost limits of their territory. The 
information about fishing sites is shared among those settlement members, creating a 
parallel with Ideal Free Distribution and foraging theory's patch choice models. The 
author showed too that changes in connectivity between areas, through landscape 
changes or blocking of passages by floating vegetation, are factored into people’s 
livelihood adaptations. The simple fact that bays and river channel entrances are 
closed off by floating vegetation mats can turn these areas into naturally unexploitable 
refuges for aquatic species (Mourão et al., 1996). The combination of rotational use, 
customary rules and loss of connectivity is likely to create a sustainable use of natural 
resources in local people’s territory. Separate analyses of local people’s movements, 
their fishing practices and of tourist fish catches in the light of changing quota 
regulations all support the sustainability of local resource use (Chiaravalloti in press). 
Apart from the historical displacement involving the location of Settlement 1, there is 
a conflict regarding the fishing area of this group. Managers from Protected Areas 
claim that local fishermen should not access fishing sites inside the Protected Area 
boundaries, and argue that in doing so they are committing a crime. Indeed, managers 
are backed by the Conservation Units Law, which specifies that National Parks or 
Private Reserves do not allow any kind of use of natural resources from traditional 
communities (Law 9.885 from 2000)3.  
 
                                                        
3 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9985.htm 
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Figure 2: Settlement 1 inhabitants’ territory highlighting dry and flooded areas. The map on the right 
highlights the location of the Pantanal in Brazil.  
Environmentalist pressure on local people has led some grassroots human rights 
organizations to support fishermen and to publicise their conflict. They helped 
families create a Formal Association, which allowed them to access small grants; 
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around 10 000 USD were invested in the community between 2007-20144.  The local 
municipality built a new school in the Settlement, which all children attend; a public 
telephone was installed because there is no mobile phone signal, and every three 
months doctors and dentists go the region to assist in any disease or health problem. 
Federal Prosecutors brought in to review the case recognized local people’s rights 
(MPF, 2013). It was established that due to their traditional occupation and 
sustainable use of natural resources they are backed by the Brazilian Constitution of 
1988 (Articles 215 and 215), by the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention – ILO 
169 (ratified  by the Brazilian Government through the Decree number 5051 from 19th 
April, 2004) and, especially, by the National Policy for the Development of 
Traditional Peoples and Communities (PNPCT  - decree number 6070, 2007) to live 
and use resources throughout the so-called “traditional territory” (Shiraishi-Neto, 
2007).  
The terms and rules that dictate the use of “traditional territories” are not clear in the 
Brazilian legislation. These areas are neither Protected Areas nor Indigenous Lands. 
They still lack a proper regulation. The only binding requirement is to adhere to 
sustainable use of natural resources (Shiraishi-Neto, 2007). However, there are no 
definitions of what constitutes sustainable use of natural resources or how local 
people should manage these areas. In fact, the right to use traditional territories was 
established as a way to offer communities living in rural areas the means to secure 
their livelihood, social cohesion and individual rights in face of  threats of physical 
and economic displacement (Calegare et al., 2014). The main idea underpinning this 
legal procedure is that once human rights are guaranteed, the management rules can 
be drawn up (Silva, 2007) and other legal agreements established to guarantee 
ecological sustainability. This can be done through fishing agreements (Pinedo-
Vasquez et al., 2011) – common in the Amazon floodplains), commitment terms 
specially created to authorize local communities to use areas inside Strictly Protected 
Areas (Sautchuk, 2007), or even creation of Sustainable Use Protected Areas 
(Calegare et al., 2014) among other possibilities. However, although no further 
agreement was reached to regulate natural resource use in Settlement 1’s traditional 
territory, there are strong indications from the RFS, the unexploitable reserves and 
tourist fish catch data that local people’s use may guarantee local ecological 
sustainability (Chiaravalloti in press). 
2.3. Federal Government rights over the area and solutions to the conflict 
The federal government’s recognition of local people’s settlement and use rights, 
however, led to a property rights overlap. As shown in Figure 3, Settlement 1’s 
traditional territory overlaps with Protected Area boundaries. Thus, on the one hand, 
the Conservation Units Law rules that fishermen are not allowed to access roughly 22 
000ha of the region or 70% of the local people’s territory. On the other, National 
                                                        
4 http://www.casa.org.br/pt/ 
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Policy of Traditional Peoples, Brazilian Constitution and ILO 169 assert their right to 
do so. To try to solve these conflicting understandings of overlapping ownership, 
federal prosecutors used a third official layer of property rights, regarding national 
ownership of floodplains. 
According to Brazilian legislation (decree n. 9660 from 19465), federal rivers are a 
public good. Under this law natural features such as the Paraguay River crossing two 
states are part of federal assets and cannot be privatized nor their exclusive ownership 
claimed. It is important to note that prosecutors calculate river limits as follows: “We 
consider as the river limit the furthest point reached by water in an ordinary 
inundation during the flood period” (informant 34, prosecutor). In the Pantanal, the 
margin of the Paraguay River, in an ordinary inundation, extends across most of the 
floodplain, an area of 86 441 km2 or roughly half of the Pantanal ecosystem 
(Padovani, 2010). Taking into account that 86.2% of the Protected Areas and 98.7% 
of the traditional territory are either permanently or periodically inundated by the 
Paraguay River during 3-4 months of the year, they are, according to law, federal 
river areas. Therefore, regardless of land titles or historical and customary ownership 
claims, the Paraguay River floodplain areas in the Pantanal are, in principle, state 
property. Moreover, recently, a new ordinance was published that authorized federal 
prosecutors to give provisional ownership to local peoples undertaking sustainable 
use of federal lands, such as rivers, marsh areas or floodplains (Ministerial ordinance 
n. 89, 20106). This is a new provision of Brazilian legislation and it is a direct 
consequence of the Brazilian National Policy for the Development of Traditional 
Peoples and Communities. It was created to solve precisely these sorts of conflicts of 
land tenure in rural areas, giving local people a provisional authorization of use 
known as The “Term of Authorization of Sustainable Use” (TAUS).  
In an attempt to solve the conflict, federal prosecutors used both laws to “open” 18% 
of the Private Protected Areas to fishermen, and to give communities a small part 
(0.04%) of one of the Private Protected Areas to use as a temporary dwelling site 
during the flood period7. However, this solution only led to further battles, and 
brought no land tenure security to either group (MPF, 2013).  
On the one hand local fishermen still faced de facto restrictions on their use of the 
protected floodplain inside their customary territory, and were being prevented from 
undertaking their traditional rotational fishing, as claimed by local fishermen: 
“prosecutors came here and said that we could fish inside the Private Protected 
Areas, however, we went there and rangers took all our fishing gears; what should we 
do? We need to eat” (informant 9, male, 52 years, bait gatherer) and “Prosecutors do 
                                                        
5 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/Del9760.htm 
6 http://patrimoniodetodos.gov.br/pastaarquivo.2009-07-09.3759851862/SPU_89-2010-
TAUS.pdf 
7 http://www.prms.mpf.mp.br/servicos/sala-de-imprensa/noticias/2013/04/comunidade-do-
pantanal-recebe-autorizacao-para-uso-sustentavel-de-area-tradicional 
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not live here, they come, say something and leave; how will they guarantee I will not 
be arrested if I use the Protected Area region?” (informant 1, male 27 years, 
fisherman). 
On the other hand, Protected Area Managers did not see the rules as a feasible 
solution, as presented by informant 28: “prosecutors spoiled everything, we used to 
have good relations with local people” “These TAUS given to local people threaten 
the core principle of protected areas: perpetuity – they are setting a dangerous 
precedent that can bring about the collapse of the whole Brazilian Protected Area 
System”. The environmental group took several actions to regain property rights over 
the protected floodplain. First they sued some prosecutors involved in the case, trying 
to repeal the property rights given to local people 8, as presented “they tried to revoke 
my act and it did not work, they did for a second time and it did not work either, now 
they are suing me in the Supreme Court” (Informant 35, prosecutor). The second 
approach was to deconstruct the idea that fishermen from Settlement 1 are covered by 
the Brazilian National Policy for the Development of Traditional Peoples and 
Communities, and to argue that they should not be granted title to their traditional 
territory. To do so, PCNAR supported the publication of a book claiming that 
fishermen settled on the floodplain no more than 30 years ago, that they do not use 
traditional practices, and they are destroying the environment; as illustrated by the 
following quotes: “their [local people’s] weak ability to organize themselves” and 
“Within the environmental impacts [...] can be counted their overfishing” (Franco et 
al., 2013, p. 91). PCNAR’s book was discredited by its lack of empirical evidence 
(Chiaravalloti, 2016): as already presented, available evidence suggests local 
communities’ resource use is sustainable (Chiaravalloti in press). Finally, the 
argument was used that Settlement 1 location is suffering from erosion, claiming that 
is “putting at risk the school structure and families’ security” (informant 28, Protected 
Area manager). Specialists on Pantanal soils agree that “the community area is 
exposed to marginal erosion”. However, they give no timeline for this settlement site 
to be eroded to the point where it disappears, as explained by informant 36 (Pantanal 
researcher): “to define whether it will be in one, two or three years is extremely hard 
[…] it will always depend on the flood regime”.  
Under mounting pressure, prosecutors made a second attempt to solve the conflict of 
property rights and use of natural resources on the Pantanal floodplain. They gave 
provisional land title to people from Settlement 1, excising a small part of a flooded 
cattle ranch on a site 12 km south from the original settlement location9 (Figure 3). 
                                                        
8 All legal and lawsuits were presented in the conciliation panel held in the Settlement 1 with all 
stakeholders on May 18, 2015.   
9 http://riosvivos.org.br/pagina-inicial/destaque-inferior/spu-declara-ser-de-interesse-publico-
area-da-comunidade-da-barra-do-sao-lourenco/ 
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The area is a non-flooding, man-made mound of roughly 2 hectares constructed by 
the federal government in the 1970s. The Prosecutors’ main rationale for doing so, 
however, is not the conflict itself but the erosion in the Settlement 1, “the permanence 
of these people in the area is impossible because of the river dynamics […] they will 
be safer in this new location” (informant 35, prosecutor). The proposed deal is to 
build new houses and a new school for local people, to be delivered by a local NGO 
partner of the community association. Supporters of the deal point out that the new 
settlement is based on the idea of an “Eco-Village, where people would live close by 
each other and will have a football pitch and a meeting centre” (informant 40, NGO 
practitioner).  According to prosecutors they will not be obliged to move to the new 
place, but the area currently made available from the protected areas will probably be 
restricted again: “we are still under negotiation, it will be like an exchange, Protected 
Areas managers build the new school and I cancel the use of the Protected floodplain 
by local people”  they will be able to access the Protected floodplain but fishing will 
be restricted to just self-consumption” (informant 35, prosecutor).  
Each group reacted differently in face of the new solution. Protected Area managers 
are supporting the new solution “the new settlement is the best strategy for community 
development” (informant 39, Protected Area manager). Researchers on the other hand 
are very concerned “families have an identity with the place, this does not relocate 
with them […] this will weaken the community” (informant 37, researcher).  The 
community itself is equally divided, the president of the local association linked with 
the NGO supposed to build the houses is very supportive, pointing out that 16 nuclear 
families out of the 23 are looking forward to moving, however, others argue that no 
more than 2 or 3 nuclear families are moving out. Local people raised many concerns. 
The first concerns spatial organization, as “living very close to each other does not 
work” (informant 9, male, 52 years, bait gatherer). The second is related to the size of 
the area designated for them: “If they build a football pitch there, only two players 
will be able to play” (informant 7, female, 48 years, fishermen). Finally, concerns 
regarding the location of the new settlement were pointed out “there are plenty of dry 
areas around here” “the new location is five hours by boat from here” (informant 41, 
female, 45 years, fishermen).  
No exact date has been set for the resettlement, nor have agreements been made as to 
whether it really is going to happen. For instance, in face of the families’ criticism, 
the local NGO due to build the new houses has already put plans on hold.  
2.4. Property and prospects in the Pantanal  
The case in the Western Border of the Pantanal clearly illustrates overlapping 
understandings of property rights. On the one hand environmental NGOs have 
acquired land title to the floodplain to create Protected Areas, which in principle gives 
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them the right to exclude outsiders. On the other hand, local communities established 
in the area roughly 150 years earlier than the Protected Areas claim access to those 
floodplain areas based on their historical customary use, and they are backed by the 
National Policy of Traditional People’s Development to do so. The government 
maintains that neither group is right, arguing that the Paraguay River floodplain is a 
public good and it is state owned. After a failed first attempt to solve the conflict, the 
second solution proposed by prosecutors to end the battle and promote sustainability 
in the region is to relocate local people giving them title to a new area further south.  
However, no attention has been paid to the perspectives that different groups have on 
property. The government approach is to use a legal / economic view to solve the 
conflict, giving different stakeholders title for different parts, and the right to exclude 
non-owners. Therefore, the state does not consider local people’s customary property 
arrangements; yet the data collected showed that these are of central importance for 
local livelihoods allowing adaptation to the changes in landscape accessibility and 
flood pulse.  
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Figure 3: Ownership overlap in the Western Border of the Pantanal. The red line indicates the traditional 
territory, the black line the Protected Area limits and the green area is, in principle, state owned. The 
orange area is the region prosecutors excised from Protected Areas to give to local people. The yellow dot 
indicates the location of the new settlement.  
3. Discussion 
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The conflict in the Western Border of the Pantanal is an important case study in 
exploring the link between sustainability and land tenure, but also in analysing the 
power play between competing interest groups, and the potential for legal frameworks 
to add to or conversely minimise conflict. The Government, NGOs and traditional 
communities using different perspectives claim ownership rights over the same 
floodplain and, interestingly, each is backed by law. Moreover, ostensibly, the main 
goal of each of the three contenders is to promote sustainable use of natural resources, 
the common objective whether of the Protected Areas Law, the National Policy 
backing local communities’ territorial claims, or the law authorizing prosecutors to 
give provisional titles. However, stakeholders’ interests clash instead of converging. 
The consequence has been comprehensive mismanagement, with the prospect of 
further damage being done through the relocation of the weakest group – local 
communities of fishermen – if they are given land title in a distant area.  
It becomes clear that the real intention of each group is to impose their own view over 
the other, rather than to aim for sustainable development or a clearer and more 
workable delineation of property regimes, tenure and access. Without reiterating the 
details, many features of the conflict suggest this: the conservation group funded by 
powerful corporations; the state’s intervention, which it is then powerless to enforce; 
the documented harassment and proposed displacement of the weaker community. 
The local situation can be understood as a power dispute, in which stakeholders use 
narratives of property ownership and environmental conservation to argue their 
interests.  
This is not particular to the Pantanal. Political interests underpin most conservation 
conflicts (Robbins, 2012, pp.13). Claims of overfishing, bushmeat overhunting or 
desertification are often not so much evidence-based conservation concerns, as 
narratives strategically deployed to impose the interests of the most powerful groups  
(Abbott and Campbell, 2009; Coad et al., 2013; Homewood, 1994). Historically 
misapplied narratives have often led to aggressive management interventions such as 
strong restrictions on the use of the natural resource or even physical displacement 
(Smith et al. 2005; Kittinger et al. 2013; Kolding and Van Zwieten 2014). Scientific 
knowledge offers one set of tools to deconstruct these narratives, giving empirical 
evidence to support or reject a specific claim. For instance, claims of overgrazed 
rangelands triggering desertification in African and Central Asian drylands have been 
shown to be inconsistent or unfounded in a number of individual and in-depth studies 
(Homewood and Rodgers 1987; Homewood 2008). The case study presented in this 
paper illustrates how claims regarding the link between ownership and sustainable use 
are used to impose the interests of powerful groups. Deconstructing such claims is a 
fundamental step towards better management of natural resources and promotion of 
local development (Neumann, 2011, 2010, 2009). While a political ecology 
framework helps that process of deconstruction, progress towards a more equitable 
working compromise depends on bringing other tools to bear. This means 
understanding the resource use system and the way it maps both to ecosystem 
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dynamics and to social organisation, and also understanding the legal frameworks 
from which different players draw their sense of legitimacy, and which can be 
invoked to rein in abuses of power or of resource extraction.  
Case studies from around the globe show how important is to consider the 
combination of anthropological, economic and ecological perspectives to better 
understand the ways property regimes and resource use play out in reality and with 
respect to sustainability of socio-ecological systems. Many multidimensional property 
arrangements encompassing such multidisciplinary views are already formally 
implemented. An illustration is seen in the USA with conservation easements. These 
are legally recognized, voluntary, formal agreements between landowners and 
conservation organizations, in which the donor agrees to not use an area in exchange 
for a reduction of federal property tax; in practice the easements become strictly 
private protected areas, managed by an external NGO, with federal incentives (Kay, 
2015). Today there are roughly 9 million hectares under this legal agreement of 
shared ownership in the USA (Mclaughlin, 2013). Although pursuing a different goal, 
this is in many ways comparable to what happens with sharecropping, in which 
private properties belonging to a primary owner are let out to a tenant who then 
negotiates a sharecropping deal (de Almeida and Buainain, 2016; Ofuoku, 2015). In 
both cases, the “bundle of rights” embodied in a specific property is formally 
disaggregated into separable rights shared out between different stakeholders: owner, 
tenant, conservation organization, etc. Another interesting if less equitable example is 
seen in Tanzania’s Wildlife Management Areas, in which groups of villages are given 
title to pooled communal land, which is set-aside for conservation and tourism 
enterprise. However, the state owns any wildlife on that land; and also owns any 
minerals under that land; at the same time villagers who are resident “owners” are 
excluded from using the resource they “own” (for instance, pastoralists are banned 
from grazing the set-aside area). The income generated from game hunting and 
mining mostly flows direct to state and bypasses land ‘owners’ (Homewood et al., 
2013; Noe, 2013; Noe and Kangalawe, 2015). Hence, although villages in principle 
own the land, they officially do not have rights over specific lucrative property layers. 
The breaking of the bundle of rights is not always backed by legal rights; and, indeed, 
multi-layered property arrangements are often informal. As illustrated by the example 
of Turkmenistan (Behnke et al., 2016), legal frameworks may change rapidly, leaving 
the imprint of historical regimes in actual practices, though with no formal 
recognition. In Turkmenistan, the imposition of a communist state onto a previously 
feudal system was followed by post-soviet conversion to a privatized system. The 
government owns all natural resources in the rangelands but half of all pastoralist 
livestock remains state property. The consequence is a plural legal system with state 
and pre-existing property institutions operating side by side: “the resulting tenure 
system was in practice a combination of abstract territorial principles and historical 
contingency, an administrative system with a memory” (Behnke et al., 2016, pp.116). 
Simply giving title to land dwellers to tackle poverty alleviation or promote 
biodiversity conservation creates a disjunct between economic and socio-historical 
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aspects of property, given that property in many realities is not a matter of 
straightforward or exclusive ownership. 
Another important point to make about the case in the Pantanal is that all proposed 
solutions seek to secure the rights of their focal group by establishing fixed 
boundaries, establishing defined properties through title. However, such an approach 
runs counter to the current understanding of flood pulse and other dynamic 
ecosystems, which recognizes that temporally and spatially fixed boundaries cannot 
track changes through time and space (Hayden et al., 2015; Levin et al., 2012; 
Lourival et al., 2011). The natural resources distributions we see today are likely to be 
very different in the future and fixed solutions do not adapt to those changes (Rist et 
al., 2013; Westgate et al., 2013), leading to a further disjunct between the western 
economic view of property and ecological understandings of sustainable natural 
resource use in ecosystems with unpredictable dynamics. 
Pastoralists in Mongolia provide a case for comparison here. Due to the unpredictable 
seasonal and annual changes in resource distribution in arid and semi-arid rangelands, 
pastoralists need extensive areas for grazing, moving around according to resource 
availability (Fernandez-Gimenez, (2002). Setting aside defined areas for pastoralists 
may undermine their livelihoods. The importance of appropriate adaptation to the 
natural changes and constraints goes beyond small-scale systems. In marine fisheries 
the presence of rotational harvesting, and the existence of inaccessible spots that 
could not be harvested, underpin sustainability (Hayden et al., 2015). Historically, 
shortage of fish resources were dealt with by moving along the coast and reducing 
fishing effort, allowing deep sea reserves to rebuild the biomass and export juveniles 
or adults to the coast (Pauly et al., 2002). However, government subsidies and 
technological advances have allowed vessels to harvest ocean deeps, entering 
previously unexploitable areas (Hayden et al., 2015). Although some authors point to 
the lack of ownership over the ocean as the main cause of marine overfishing 
(attributing lack of sustainability to the open access regime), authoritative analysis 
identifies the failure of adaptation to the natural system through technology’s 
accessing formerly unexploitable reserves as playing the most important role (Pauly, 
2003). In the Pantanal, the on-going changes in river flow regulate fishermen’s 
territories, and their adaptation to those changes is likely the keystone for sustainable 
use of natural resources in the region (Chiaravalloti in press). Restrictions on this 
adaptive customary management of natural resource use, such as establishing defined 
areas that fishermen can use and others from which they are excluded, are likely to 
disrupt the rotational fishing system, which is emerging as underpinning both 
biodiversity conservation and income for local people.  
The disjunct between property as it is held on the ground, and the hegemonic western 
view of property, can become the basis for environmental narratives justifying 
aggressive management practices and interventions, including displacements, 
implementation of alternative livelihoods, or heavy-handed enforcement around use 
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of natural resources (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Rantala et al., 2013; Wright et al., 
2016). These interventions are often adopted from quite different systems, opening 
space to financial capital and external investors in the region, allowing monetization 
of the area (Büscher et al., 2012). As a consequence small-scale users of natural 
resources are replaced by large investors, focusing either on (claimed) environmental 
conservation or on extraction of natural resources (Zoomers, 2010). It is no surprise, 
therefore, that, in the Pantanal, the “Protection and Conservation Network for the 
Amolar Region” (PCNAR), according to local informants, was funded by a mining 
company and an investment bank.  
To conclude, secure access to land and guaranteed property rights are indeed key 
elements in tackling poverty alleviation and environmental conservation. The 
approach to guarantee such a link, however, needs to encompass a broader 
perspective than simple land titling. Property is composed of multiple components 
involving social, economic and environmental dimensions. Empirical examples 
constantly reaffirm this understanding. Moreover, property is a mutable structure that 
adapts to internal and external changes. Therefore, setting defined ownership and 
rights to exclude through land titling may be a myopic view of property particularly in 
ecosystems subject to unpredictable dynamics, such as characterise many South 
CPRs. It will keep failing to bring the results expected; and, most importantly, does 
not necessarily secure access to land, guarantee property rights and, therefore, 
sustainability. The conflict in the Western Border of the Pantanal illustrates a case 
study of just such a persistent disconnect. Although land titling proved a poor way to 
solve land conflict in the region, prosecutors insisted on applying the same approach 
in a second attempt. The conflict between conservationists and local communities is 
likely to remain unresolved, and the state likely to continue to fail in enforcing 
rulings, all of which may jeopardize both biodiversity conservation and local people’s 
livelihoods.  
Public policies intended to bring sustainable development need to map better onto 
grassroots reality. We propose that before allocating land title to different groups or 
individuals, a first step should be to describe the most important drivers dictating 
property from the perspectives of anthropology, ecology and economics. This wider 
understanding is more likely to integrate management policies with local realities in 
sustainable ways. In the Pantanal, instead of setting aside reserves for use or non-use, 
policymakers could propose a more flexible property system, in which areas are 
protected but allowed to change according to flood pulse and area flooded. Although 
each case faces a unique combination of social and historical factors shaping their 
property regime, such approaches could be replicated in other floodplains facing 
similar biophysical dynamism and comparable conflict over tenure and access.   
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